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This article details a systemic analysis of the controls in place and possible interventions avail-
able to further reduce the risk of a foot and mouth disease (FMD) outbreak in the United
Kingdom. Using a research-based network analysis tool, we identify vulnerabilities within the
multibarrier control system and their corresponding critical control points (CCPs). CCPs rep-
resent opportunities for active intervention that produce the greatest improvement to United
Kingdom’s resilience to future FMD outbreaks. Using an adapted ‘features, events, and pro-
cesses’ (FEPs) methodology and network analysis, our results suggest that movements of an-
imals and goods associated with legal activities significantly influence the system’s behavior
due to their higher frequency and ability to combine and create scenarios of exposure similar
in origin to the U.K. FMD outbreaks of 1967/8 and 2001. The systemic risk assessment high-
lights areas outside of disease control that are relevant to disease spread. Further, it proves
to be a powerful tool for demonstrating the need for implementing disease controls that have
not previously been part of the system.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Foot and mouth disease (FMD) is an exotic an-
imal disease (EAD) classified as notifiable by the
World Organisation for Animal Health.(1) The dis-
ease is caused by the FMD virus (FMDv), of theAph-
thovirus genus and Picornaviridae family(2–4) with
manifestations ranging from acute to mild and sub-
acute forms, in cloven-hoofed animals, e.g., cattle,
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pigs, sheep, and deer. Under certain conditions,
damp soil and cold temperatures, FMDv can persist
for over a month outside its host, and plumes of virus
within droplets can travel over long distances,(5) all
of which can contribute to the spread of infection
across large distances. Cattle, sheep, and pigs can be
infected through inhalation of virus particles, inges-
tion of FMDv particles from contaminated food, con-
tact with fomites, e.g., vehicles and people, and direct
contact with infected animals.(4,6) As a result, infec-
tion tends to spread quickly through multiple mech-
anisms making the control of widespread infections
challenging.(6) Morbidity and mortality rates vary ac-
cording to the species infected and the virulence of
the strain.(3,4)
Outbreaks of FMD can result in severe eco-
nomic losses, from the cost of essential eradica-
tion measures, lost market share and impacts to
tourism.(7–9) The United Kingdom maintains a multi-
barrier system that seeks to prevent the introduction
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of EADs such as FMD into the country. The sys-
tem of controls comprises the collaborative actions
of a partnership of government organizations and in-
dependent agents; for example, the Department for
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), lo-
cal authorities, Border Force, wildlife conservation
groups, farmers, and veterinarians.(10) Working in-
dependently, these agents operate a complex net-
work of protection barriers to prevent the transmis-
sion of EAD, including FMD, that operates as a
whole system.(11) The system purposefully incorpo-
rates an element of redundancy, to ensure that multi-
ple opportunities for detection and elimination of an
FMD outbreak are available from source to recep-
tor. This increases protection against a multitude of
possible transmission routes.(12) However, occasional
outbreaks do occur, such as those of 2001 and 2007
(for theUnited Kingdom), which exposed vulnerabil-
ities in the multibarrier system.(7,13–15) Since then, sig-
nificant effort has been made to increase awareness
of U.K. vulnerabilities to FMD in order to reduce the
chances of a future outbreak.(10) However, reports
suggest that developed countries may still be vulner-
able to the threat of FMD and other EADs.(8,16,17)
Government is responsible for developing
and enforcing regulations that reduce the United
Kingdom’s vulnerability to FMD alongside other
EADs.(10) Analysis of the existing system of controls
for policy development needs to consider the extent
to which current practices are either effective; could
be enhanced, or where priorities should change
focus of attention to new areas for active inter-
vention. Improvements require the prioritization
of possible failures that might drive exposure to
FMD of susceptible livestock. Critically, these pri-
orities must be risk-informed and reflect the entire
system. Securing this insight involves developing a
comprehensive analysis of the systemic interactions
between FMD and the points of potential failure
within the multiple-barrier system, using a systemic
risk assessment.(11)
Here, we present a systemic risk assessment
for the introduction of FMD into the United King-
dom. The objectives of this research were the iden-
tification of vulnerabilities within the multibarrier
control system and corresponding critical control
points (CCPs). CCPs represent opportunities for ac-
tive intervention that produce the greatest improve-
ment to United Kingdom’s resilience to future FMD
outbreaks.(18) The expectation is that this approach
to developing priorities can inform decisions about
resource allocation for risk management.(18)
2. METHOD
We applied the systemic model of Delgado et al.
(2013) and increased the level of detail with which
the outputs are produced.(11) In its current format,
this is a research model that provides an analysis of
all pathways of exposure available within the concep-
tual representation of the U.K. livestock system us-
ing a network to represent the system (Fig. 1). The
network considers the frequency of movements and
the effectiveness of barriers to transmission between
nodes. This includes legal, illegal movements, and
airborne transmission, as the base for characterizing
system behavior. A series of sensitivity analyses was
applied to the network, allowing the identification
of those nodes and arcs with the greatest influence
on the system’s performance. These represent the
CCPs, indicating where intervention might be most
effective.(11,18)
2.1. Description of the System
The network is a representation of the system
describing (i) the collection of entities influencing
transmission, which by interacting with the FMDv
establish a connection linking the FMD source to a
susceptible receptor. The network then (ii) describes
the controls and regulations in place that these enti-
ties and stakeholders must uphold to interrupt con-
nections between the source and receptors, and so
prevent exposure. Entities include several compo-
nents of the livestock and meat industries, facilities
for trade, human population, and pet-shops, as well
as a range of control processes.(10) The system consid-
ers three disease sources, where pathways must begin
and for the purpose of this assessment, where FMDv
is present, confirmed and contingency measures put
in place. These are represented by the nodes: (1)
1.1 World (all remaining countries)/non-EU trad-
ing partners/bilateral; (2) 1.2 European Union and
trading partners (Positive) (i.e., EU member coun-
try with a confirmed outbreak, and where measures
are in place to prevent spread); and (3) 1.3 Labo-
ratories. European countries where an outbreak is
present but not yet detected are defined as 2.1 Eu-
ropean Union & trading partners (negative—disease
free status) and are not a considered source but part
of the pathway. The system also allows the ana-
lyst to consider nine possible final receptors, which
are broadly representative of different husbandry
practices, where pathways must end and thus repre-
sented by the nodes. (1) 3.1 Pig Indoor production
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Fig. 1. The network system developed for foot and mouth disease (FMD). Nodes starting with 1 represent disease sources (gray), nodes
starting with 2 represent full functioning nodes (black), and nodes names starting with 3 represent terminal nodes (gray)
units; (2) 3.2 Pig Outdoor production units; (3) 3.3
Pig breeding units; (4) 3.4 Dairy production; (5) 3.5
Beef production; (6) 3.6 Cattle breeding units; (7) 3.7
Sheep outdoor production units; (8) 3.8 Sheep breed-
ing units; and (9) 3.9 Mixed species farms (Fig. 1).
The different receptor categories were informed by
experts and represent production systems with dif-
ferent biosecurity challenges and expectations. The
system is constructed using a “features, events, and
processes” (FEPs) list.(19,20) The FEP list records the
network nodes as features, network arcs represent-
ing activities enabling transmission recorded as pro-
cesses, and the incidents driving failure to detect and
eliminate the disease agent are recorded as events.
Disease transmission between two nodes requires the
combination of a process and an event, referred to
here as process/events.(11) For example, a border in-
spection post is the node, the process is the release of
meat goods to food markets/retailers, and the event
is failure to detect contaminated meat. This sys-
temic approach allows discrimination between trans-
mission movements associated with legal and illegal
activities, and airborne transmission of the disease
agent. Up to three separate process/events can be
associated with a connection between two adjacent
nodes.
2.2. The Interaction Matrix
The analytic foundation of the model is the net-
work (Fig. 1) represented by an interaction matrix
(Fig. 2). In the matrix, diagonal cells (black) corre-
spond to nodes and the off-diagonal cells (white and
color) correspond to arcs. Features from the FEP
list populate the node cells and the associated pro-
cess/events populate the off-diagonal cells. Rows list
all movements outgoing from the respective node.
For example, row “j” represents all outgoing connec-
tions enabling transmission from the node, i.e., “2.7
Domestic animals/backyard farms.” Columns list all
incoming movements to the respective node. Each
node is associated with three columns: “Legal” rep-
resents legal movements; “Airbrn” represents air-
borne transmission of FMD; “Illegal” represents ille-
gal movements (top of Fig. 2). For example, columns
19, 20, and 21 contain all legal, airborne, and illegal
incoming movements enabling transmission to node
“2.7 Domestic animals/backyard farms.” Filled cells
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Fig. 2. FMD interaction matrix. The diagonal cells (black) represent the nodes (features) and the off-diagonal cells represent the arcs (pro-
cess events, where L—legal movement; A—airborne transmission; and I—illegal movements). Empty cells represent impossible movements
between two adjacent nodes. (b) represents a close-up of a section of the matrix.
represent the movements considered possible by the
experts. These contain the value for the reduction in
the likelihood of system failure associated with in-
tervention in the respective process/event. The def-
inition of illegal movement was the subject of sub-
stantial debate during the preparatory stages of the
model. Following expert consultation, illegal move-
ments were broadly defined as “noncompliant move-
ments, sabotage, negligence, and recklessness.” Using
this definition, experts were given discretion to apply
professional judgment when interpreting the concept
of legal and illegal activities in the context of each
process. The completed matrix in Fig. 2 represents
all possible adjacent connections in the system and
the building blocks to create all possible pathways of
exposure.
2.3. Data Collection
The matrix was populated using expert elicita-
tion, with a two-stage process(21,22) used to accom-
plish this. The first stage involved five interviews that
took place between second and fourth week of Jan
2011, and the second stage involved one workshop
on the March 9th, 2011.
2.3.1. Stage 1: Defining the Network
The first stage of elicitation aimed at develop-
ing the collection of nodes that form the basic struc-
ture of the network. After preparatory work, where
a collection of nodes were defined, a series of un-
structured interviews were used to revise the node
collection.(11) Information was elicited fromDefra in-
house experts, performing roles requiring a wide un-
derstanding of the system. Experts were allowed to
add, eliminate, and redefine nodes. The final version
of the network was presented and accepted by a tech-
nical advisory group, composed of experts in notifi-
able diseases, in risk and disease modeling and policy
development, four weeks prior to the second stage of
the elicitation process in March 2011.
2.3.2. Stage 2: Assessing Internodes Connections
The second stage of elicitation employed a struc-
tured workshop. The aim of this workshop was to
characterize the connections between nodes, based
on the frequency of movements between nodes and
efficacy of barriers to transmission. As such, ex-
pert selection focused on identifying those individ-
uals with specific knowledge of key areas of the
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network. The process was mediated by Defra with
individuals targeted from different organizations
having responsibility over a different section of
the system, e.g., policy makers and Trading Stan-
dards (Defra, LACORS), local authorities (London,
Cornwall, and Suffolk), the National Pig Association
(industry), epidemiology (VLA), and environment
and wildlife (ADAS, Defra). Invitations included a
questionnaire inviting experts to confirm their exper-
tise, and the process concluded when all nodes were
allocated. Experts were allocated to two nodes and a
total of 24 experts took part in the workshop.
The workshop was structured in two sessions; a
first session composed of presentations and calibra-
tion exercises to ensure experts started from a com-
mon understanding of the rules and use of elicita-
tion scales (Fig. 3). We selected a logarithmic scale
to characterize barrier efficacy in light of the extreme
range of probabilities across the system.(23,24) This
representation of probability has limitations exam-
ined in the discussion.
The second session that followed comprised ex-
ercises to elicit information on the connections be-
tween the 26 network nodes (Fig. 1). Experts were
divided into groups based on the allocated nodes.
The nine terminal nodes were excluded from the
expert elicitation, thus only 17 nodes were part of
the assessment. Exercises focused on assessing all
outgoing connections from the allocated node to all
other nodes comprised in the network. A node spe-
cific questionnaire, containing all predefined poten-
tial connections with adjacent nodes (25 legal, 25 ille-
gal, and a variable number for airborne transmission)
and respective elicitation scales (Fig. 3), was dis-
tributed to each group. When completing the ques-
tionnaire, for each connection between two nodes,
experts were asked to ignore its placement within
the network and consider the following questions:
(1) Is a connection between node A to node X pos-
sible and, if YES, how frequent are movements be-
tween nodes A and X, using the quantitative scale on
the left side?; (2) If there are barriers preventing the
movement of contaminated goods and infected ani-
mals between the two nodes, could you define how
likely they are to fail, using the right-side scale? All
information was obtained following group discussion
and questionnaires were completed as a group. The
same sequence of questions was used independently
for legal and illegal movements. Process/events asso-
ciated with legal and illegal movement were charac-
terized by expert knowledge of their incidence and
barrier failure rates (BFRs). Airborne transmission
was considered possible between two nodes where
live animals are present, and experts were asked to
use the likelihood scale only, similar to that used to
characterize legal and illegal movements, so to assess
the likelihood of transmission between them. Facil-
itators listened to group discussions and intervened
only when necessary to provide clarification on the
process, in order to minimize the influence of bias
and to ensure that the information gathered com-
plied with data needs.(21,22,25) Connections identified
as not available by experts had to be identified as not
available in writing in the questionnaire. Two facili-
tators (JD and PL) monitored group discussions and
intervened whenever necessary to ensure expert dis-
cussion remain consistent across groups. At the end
of the exercise, over 1,000 possible connections were
analyzed and a quantitative characterization of the
network produced. Verification of the elicited data
was performed through follow-up interviews. Here,
after review of the data by the assessors, specific ex-
perts used in the workshop were contacted to confirm
or comment on specific data points regarding issues
of data quality, missing values, and unclear notes in
the comment sections.(26)
2.4. Generating and Calculation of Scenarios
for Disease Introduction
To generate all pathways available between
source and receptors nodes, we applied the model
described by Delgado et al. (2013).(11) An exposure
scenario consists of a single pathway, composed of a
sequence of movements between nodes allowing for
the introduction of FMD and its onward exposure
until livestock is exposed to it. Thus, it is defined as
a sequence of nodes and arcs creating a pathway be-
tween source and receptor, where the end point is the
introduction of FMDv into a commercial livestock
farm, which is assumed to result in exposure of live-
stock animals. For example, in Fig. 2, the representa-
tion of one from the array of possible pathways rep-
resenting a contaminated product being introduced
legally from an EU country without an FMD-free
status and culminating with the exposure to sheep in
an outdoor production unit, is achieved by this se-
quence of nodes and arcs: node 1.2 European Union
and trading partners [Positive]= > arc b22= > node
2.8 Human population = > arc k63 = > node 3.7
Sheep Outdoor production units. These can be direct
pathways, composed of two nodes and one arc (k =
1, where k is the number of arcs) or indirect path-
ways that encompass more than two nodes and more
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Fig. 3. Elicitation form used in the workshop to retrieve the seed variables associated with the process/events legal and illegal from experts.
The same likelihood scale was used to characterize the likelihood of airborne transmission.
than one arc (k  2).(27) In this assessment, a maxi-
mum scenario length of k = 4 was defined to manage
the volume of outputs produced. This limit was based
on the computing power available. A k = 5 simu-
lation generates over 8 million pathways, and thus
makes it impossible to complete the sensitivity analy-
ses. The model was constructed on a preprogrammed
ExcelTM spreadsheet that, when applied to the inter-
action matrix, generated all possible combinations of
scenarios introducing FMD into theUnited Kingdom
for k  4. Estimation of the likelihood for a pathway
follows Equation (1)(11):
P∗(s,r) = X(s,i1).X(i1,i2).X(i2,i3)... . X(im−1,im).X(im,r), (1)
where P∗(s,r) represents the scenario likelihood from
source node (s) and a receptor node (r) and i repre-
sents the random adjacent nodes in a network with
n nodes. In Equation (2), X(i, j) represents the likeli-
hood of a movement between two adjacent selected
nodes in the network, defined as i and j due to the
barrier within the system failing. This is calculated by
Equation (2)(11):
X(i, j) =
Ic(i, j)
i−1c=1 Ic(i,c) + nc=i+1 Ic(i,c)
·
BFR(i,j) ; for j = i (2)
where i = 1, . . . ,n.
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The value calculated by Equations (1) and (2)
represents the likelihood of all barriers in the sys-
tem failing when considering the levels of incidence
between two adjacent nodes—Ic(i,j)—and respective
BFRs in the scenario.(11) It provides a “score” allow-
ing for the comparative discrimination of scenarios
according to the likelihood of a concerted failure of
the complete set of controls in place. The sum of all
scenario likelihoods provides an indication of the sys-
tem vulnerability; an assessment of the likelihood of
FMD introduction through any one of the available
pathways and thus a baseline by which to compare
the impact of changes to the system.
2.5. Sensitivity Analysis
System sensitivity analysis was achieved using
a local “one at a time” sensitivity approach,(28,29)
whereby the system was made more resilient by aug-
menting one process/event at a time. This targeted
each arc (process/event) individually, reducing the
likelihood of barrier failure by 50%(11,28,29) and ex-
amining the impact on the system performance as
a whole. This allows for a better understanding of
the relationships between improvement of the bar-
riers in a specific arc, and the corresponding im-
pact on the overall system resilience, considering all
available pathways simultaneously. Additional sen-
sitivity analyses were performed targeting multiple
arcs simultaneously. These represent interventions
that affect multiple barriers across the system and
include:
(i) a sensitivity analysis targeting the nodes, that
is, all outgoing arcs associated with a particular
node—e.g., all outgoing movements from EU
member countries where an outbreak has been
confirmed (Fig. 4 describes the result of the 26
simulations); and
(ii) a sensitivity analysis targeting movement types,
that is, those classified as legal, illegal, and air-
borne transmission. This involved running one
simulation targeting all connections defined
as legal, one targeting all illegal connections
and one targeting all connections involving
airborne transmission. In a scenario composed
of three legal connections and two illegal ones
considering, the likelihood of system failure
for the two illegal connections was decreased
by a likelihood of 50%, while the remainder
remained unchanged. Fig. 7 later describes the
results of the three simulations.
For all sensitivity analyses, the outputs describe,
in percentage terms, the expected improvement in
reducing the overall residual risk of exposure, i.e., re-
silience of the system to FMD.
3. RESULTS
3.1. Systemic Perspective of the Multibarrier
System
The data provided by experts identified and
quantified 694 adjacent connections between two
nodes (Fig. 1). This study generated over half a mil-
lion (i.e., 544,066) theoretical exposure pathways, al-
lowing for successful exposure of FMD from any one
of the three defined sources to any one of the nine
defined receptors, and calculated a comparative like-
lihood value for each. This, in itself, improves our
understanding of the behavior of system components
and their influence on its vulnerability during an in-
cursion of FMD into the United Kingdom (Fig. 2).
The interaction matrix describes the arcs of the sys-
tem characterized according to their impacts on sys-
tem vulnerability—within the context of the full net-
work. The color coding distinguishes those arcs with
greater influence, based on the results produced by
the arc sensitivity analysis. From the analysis, human
actions play an important role in introducing the dis-
ease agent from foreign countries within and outside
the European Union. From the collection of experts’
comments included in the questionnaire, activities as-
sociated with human population mostly comprised of
the ability to transport animal products, e.g., meat,
or acting as a fomite. For example, importation of
live animals to backyard farms does not involve the
node “2.8 Human population.” A connection is es-
tablished directly between source country and the
node backyard farms. The node, human population
also plays a significant role in exposing livestock ani-
mals to FMDv, as does the environment, wildlife, and
backyard farmers.
3.2. Varying the System Priorities
System size complicates the analysis. Therefore,
the network and interaction matrix provides a valu-
able systemic understanding. However, as these com-
press the representation of knowledge into a single
image, it may prove too simplistic for a comprehen-
sive analysis of the system. This is caused by the
large volume of information included, as each of the
8 Delgado et al.
Fig. 4. FMD node sensitivity analysis, describing
the nodes of the network in order of importance re-
garding their influence in the likelihood of system
failure. The figure describes the impact of decreas-
ing by 50% all outgoing arcs from each node.
Fig. 5. “2.8 human population” arc sensi-
tivity analysis. Representing the 10 most
influential process/events associated with
the “2.8 human population” node in or-
der of importance regarding their influ-
ence in the likelihood of system failure.
17 nodes—excluding receptor nodes—reflect an av-
erage of 65 connections to adjacent nodes, including
incoming and outgoing movements, both of which in-
clude legal and illegal activities and airborne trans-
mission. Compared to the detail provided by numer-
ical outputs, the power to visualize the complexity of
the interaction matrix is reduced by the broad cat-
egorical intervals used in the color scheme and in
the difficulty of representing the comparative influ-
ence of nodes and associated arcs. To address this, a
comprehensive output was developed using a se-
quence of analyses progressing with increasing detail
(Figs. 4 and 5). The format results from the sensi-
tivity analyses, which focused on nodes and the pro-
cess/events separately, thus assessing the network at
different levels of detail. This progressive analysis
narrowed the perspective from top to bottom, per-
mitting an increase in detail with which the system is
described and analyzed when compared to conven-
tional risk assessment methods.(11)
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First, we present a high-level analysis of the sys-
tem. This is associated with a node sensitivity anal-
ysis that focuses on the identification of the net-
work nodes possessing the greatest influence on the
likelihood of system failure. Fig. 4 displays the re-
sults of 26 analyses, with the influence of each node
on system behavior represented by the reduction in
percentage to system vulnerability compared to our
baseline residual risk of exposing livestock to FMD.
Human population (49%) and European countries
(positive)—with confirmed FMD outbreak—(47%)
had the greatest influence with over 40% reduction
to the baseline residual risk. This means an interven-
tion in all outgoing process/events (arcs) associated
with these nodes may potentially result in a reduction
in likelihood of an FMD outbreak of greater than
40%. In contrast, other nodes such as waste disposal,
slaughterhouses, and feed factories apparently have
negligible influence on network behavior.
Understanding the causes of node influence re-
quires us to examine the process/events that most
influence system behavior, and then to distinguish
between those process/events delivered through le-
gal and illegal routes, i.e., noncompliant activities
and airborne transmission. Fig. 5 focuses on the
most influential node, “2.8 Human population,” de-
scribing the 10 highest influential process/events as-
sociated with this node. Forty-four additional pro-
cess/events representing possible transmission to
and from “2.8 Human population” were identified
(Fig. 2) but not included here, for brevity. The pro-
cess/events are characterized as legal, illegal, and
airborne transmission movements (color scheme),
and separated into outgoing and incoming move-
ments through the prefix [Out] and [In], respec-
tively. In this case, all 10 of the most influential
process/events represent legal movements, as noted
in the key to the graph. The most influential pro-
cess/event, “[In] 1.2 European Union and trading
partners [Positive]” (47%) represents the movement
of FMDv from a country within the EU where FMD
has been confirmed to the U.K. general popula-
tion through, for example “personal imports of meat-
based food products” (a comment collected in the
workshop). The introduction of FMD from “[In]
1.1 World (all remaining countries)/trading part-
ners/Bilateral” (2%) also presents a concern. The
remaining eight process/events represent outgoing
movements. The highest ranked is “[Out] 2.12 An-
imal gatherings within UK” (18%), which repre-
sents the potential transmission of FMDv by the
human population, perchance acting as fomites and
carrying food products of animal origin to local mar-
kets trading live animals and animal shows. Other
significant outgoing process/events involve connec-
tions to the “[Out] 2.3 environment” (13%), “Sheep
outdoor production units” (12%), “[Out] 2.7 Do-
mestic animals/backyard farms” (1%), “[Out] 3.5
Beef production” (1%), “[Out] 3.4 Dairy produc-
tion” (1%), “[Out] 3.2 Pig Outdoor production units”
(1%), and “[Out] 3.9 Mixed species farms” (1%).
3.3. Disease Sources
Outbreak pathways are significantly impacted
by the disease source. The application of the sys-
temic model to study FMD considers three inde-
pendent disease sources. Fig. 6 displays the relation-
ship between the disease sources relative to their
contribution to the likelihood of an outbreak. Path-
ways initiating in “1.2 European Union and trading
partners [positive],” representing EU member coun-
tries with a confirmed FMD outbreak, present the
greatest threat, accounting for 95% of all residual
risk of exposure of FMDv to susceptible receptors.
Pathways initiating in “1.1 Third countries outside
EU” representing third countries contribute to 5%
of the residual risk of exposure. Lastly, pathways as-
sociated with “1.3 Laboratory” representing releases
of FMDv from U.K.-based laboratories account for
the remaining 0.003% of the overall residual risk of
exposure.
3.4. Transmission of FMD through Legal, Illegal
Movements, and Airborne Spread
Model development and its application sought
to provide a distinction between the contributions
to residual risk of exposure associated with legal
and illegal activities and airborne transmission. The
network considers 694 process/events from which
302 represent movements associated with legal activ-
ities, 264 represent movements associated with illegal
activities, and 128 represent movements associated
with airborne transmission of FMDv (Fig. 2). The
sensitivity analysis applied to legal movements in-
volved targeting all legal movements simultaneously.
This analysis showed that improving the capacity to
prevent transmission of the FMD through all legal
movements would reduce the residual risk of expo-
sure by 83%. In contrast, a similar analysis that tar-
geted illegal movements disclosed a reduction in the
risk of exposure to livestock by 0.06%. A third anal-
ysis applied to the transmission of FMDv through
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Fig. 6. Comparison between disease sources. Relation between the number of pathways and contribution to likelihood of system failure:
Left Y-axis representing number of pathways; Right Y-axis the contribution to likelihood of exposure (0 to 1).
airborne movements describes an improvement in
reduction of residual risk by 26%. Fig. 2 presents
the results from the “one at a time” sensitivity analy-
sis, where illegal movements between third countries
and backyard farms are identified as the sole illegal
movement where intervention is likely to improve re-
silience over the 0.01% threshold value.
4. DISCUSSION
4.1. Current Risk of an FMD Outbreak
Food safety authorities have expressed concern
over the continued need to reduce the residual risk
of EAD outbreaks, including FMDv.(8,16,17) This re-
search offers insight into why further risk reductions
are challenging to achieve, despite continuing im-
provements in monitoring and detection. We offer
insight into where resources might be best targeted
to reducing the United Kingdom’s overall vulnera-
bility to FMD. The strength of this analysis is in com-
paring the relative risk changes due to interventions
within the system rather than the absolute risk of an
FMD outbreak. Thus, it does not define an estimate
of the current level of residual risk. Rather, it offers
an analysis of the relative contributions from various
interventions in specific nodes and arcs to reducing
the residual risk of livestock being exposed to FMDv.
Understanding how system behavior changes,
and identifying emerging threats driving the risk of
introducing an EAD, can inform intervention deci-
sions. Historical records of animal disease outbreaks
worldwide contain examples of where controls al-
ready in place were inadequate to deal with exist-
ing threats. Focusing on the suspected pathways of
past FMD outbreaks in the United Kingdom alone
provides examples of the systemic nature of expo-
sure. For the 1967/1968 outbreak, FMD was likely
to have been introduced through the legal impor-
tation of contaminated frozen lamb (on-the-bone)
from Argentina, which was then used to feed pet
dogs in contact with a piggery. Reactivation of the
infection, following control of the outbreak, was at-
tributed to straw and hay that remained on farm fol-
lowing stamp-out, cleansing, and disinfection.(30,31)
Subsequent investigations into the outbreak led to
policy changes, namely, for meat imports, in order
to minimize the risk of a future outbreak with sim-
ilar causes. Similarly, investigations of the FMD out-
break in 2001, linked it to swill fed to pigs at a fin-
ishing unit licensed to feed catering waste, albeit the
swill was not properly treated, and led to the total
ban of swill feeding in 2002 to improve U.K. pro-
tection to FMD.(7,32) These examples demonstrate
outbreak incidents where disease transmission oc-
curred despite the existence of regulation and codes
of good practice. The regulations and controls did not
consider the full range of practices undertaken by the
industry and farmers, and in some cases did not pro-
vide adequate protection against exposure. In both
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cases, regulation was amended postincident to avoid
a future outbreak by the same routes.
National and international regulatory bodies re-
sponsible for preventing FMD outbreaks have in-
creased focus on the changes to international trade
and the political dynamics represented by Euro-
pean agreements for free trade and the movement
of people.(9,33,34) These have eased the movement
of goods and people, reducing the opportunities for
control, especially in the case of personal imports of
meat and other animal products, raising questions
on the role that noncommercial pathways may play
in the introduction of FMD into the United King-
dom and its exposure to commercial livestock.(8,17)
Veterinary control measures are put in place when
an outbreak is confirmed in an EU country with
the aim of minimizing the risk of introducing FMD
through themovement of contaminated animal prod-
ucts. However, the high frequency of these move-
ments compared to those originating from outside
the EU means their potential contribution to the
United Kingdom’s vulnerability to FMD remains
worthy of further analysis and scrutiny.
4.2. Opportunities for Reducing the Residual Risk
of Exposure to FMD
This considers (i) all entities influencing trans-
mission, which, by interacting with a specific EAD
agent establish a connection that links the source to
the receptor; and (ii) the controls and regulations
that stakeholders have to uphold in order to prevent
connections and exposure. In doing so, it analyses all
pathways of exposure simultaneously, irrespective of
their likelihood, and allows for identification of the
key nodes and process/events driving the risk of ex-
posing livestock to an EAD.(11)
The results presented are consistent with the cur-
rent shift in concerns regarding the causes of United
Kingdom’s and other developed countries, vulner-
ability to FMD. The focus on importation of live
animals and other movements associated with the
livestock industry, germplasm, feed, and livestock
lorries,(35–41) has, to some extent, changed emphasiz-
ing the role that noncommercial routes have in the
introduction of FMD.(42–44) The systemic model in-
dicates that direct movements from source to farms
and through border inspection posts, including trade
associated with the livestock industry, pose little in-
fluence on system behavior. Thus, the controls in
place are effective, further improvements may pro-
vide little reduction in residual risk (Fig. 4). Simi-
larly, our research results highlight noncommercial
imports of food goods, and most importantly, those
associated with freedom of movement for people and
goods across borders, as of concern.(8,17) The results
suggest a further reduction to the residual risk of in-
troducing FMD into the United Kingdom could best
be managed by focusing on improving controls over
noncommercial movements across and within bor-
ders of live animals and animal products associated
with the nodes “2.8 Human population” and “2.7 Do-
mestic animals/backyard farms” (Fig. 4). Here, con-
trolling movements between the source “1.2 Euro-
pean Union and Trading partners [positive]” and”2.8
Human population” would provide the greatest ben-
efits in preventing future exposure of commercial
livestock to FMD.
The findings of the systemic model highlight that
“illegal” activities are not driving exposure. The out-
puts in Fig. 7 indicate that increasing control over ac-
tivities currently defined as illegal and noncompliant
is unlikely to significantly reduce resilience against
EADs. Instead, the results suggest that intervention
in movements, i.e., process/events, available between
nodes that are currently legal, due to a lack of aware-
ness and/or regulation, presents the greater opportu-
nity to reduce the residual risk of exposure to FMD.
We argue that legal movements pose a significant in-
fluence on system behavior. This is due to:(1) a much
higher frequency of legal movements, compared to il-
legal ones, that amplifies the impact of barrier failure
on system behavior due to the increased challenge
that is a feature of the number of these legal move-
ments. In addition,(2) legal movement can combine to
create unforeseen scenarios of exposure, not dissim-
ilar to those responsible for the FMD outbreaks of
1967/1968, for which regulations and controls do not
provide adequate protection.(30,31)
Based on the findings of the systemic model, we
argue that it is necessary to understand better the
range of compliant practices associated with non-
commercial activities and free movement of individ-
uals that allow FMD to overcome and circumvent
the barriers to transfer virus. Here, intervention pro-
vides a significant opportunity to improve system
resilience.
4.3. Challenges and Limitations to Developing
a Systemic Model
The application of systemic models is in its in-
fancy and as such it presents a number of method-
ological issues, which need overcoming to improve
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Fig. 7. Sensitivity analysis of the consid-
ered movement types: legal, illegal, and
airborne transmission.
reliability. While the model does increase the num-
ber of pathways analyzed, to include pathways pre-
viously unaccounted for, the scope of the assess-
ment involves managing a balance between level
of detail and practicality. As such, calculated sac-
rifices were made on the details within the model
in favor of a model that considers many differ-
ent exposure routes. Here, we highlight some of
the key issues, which need addressing in future
applications.
The generic nature of the assessment meant that
it was too complex to generate estimates of preva-
lence of FMD loads at the sources. As a result, the
model does not consider the prevalence of disease
at source or the quantity of virus present through
the pathways. While the subject was discussed among
members of the technical advisory group, its incor-
poration within the assessment was not straightfor-
ward and could not be pursued within this study.
Prevalence of virus at source and load of virus are
central in the development of probability-based risk
assessment,(23,45,46) and its absence likely reduces the
accuracy of the model and means that it does not ac-
count for the likelihood of an outbreak in the United
Kingdom.
The number of variables to elicit and the lim-
ited time and experts present in the work meant
selecting a time-efficient, pragmatic approach for
the elicitation protocol in detriment of more time-
consuming, albeit possibly more robust elicitation
process.(26) Despite this compromise, the process was
designed to minimize bias that we believe was re-
duced to acceptable levels.(26,47) Systemic modeling is
underpinned by limiting the use of experts to pro-
vide judgment on a narrow domain for which they
are a recognized expert. Experts are encouraged
to explore all possible connections within that do-
main, thus reducing the potential biasing effects of
motivation and availability. However, selection of a
simplistic elicitation process based on group discus-
sions opens the process to other biasing effects, such
as dominance by personality,(23) whereas alternative
methods may control this better.(48,49) We also high-
light the introduction of logarithmic scale of rela-
tive frequencies, necessary to capture the wide range
of likelihoods of barrier failures where linear scales
underperform.(24) Such scales tend not to conform
with the experts’ mental models of probability.(24)
However, due to the experts’ technical/scientific
background, the elicitation protocol assumes a high
degree of numeracy alongside their ability to inter-
pret numeric scales correctly.(50)
Risk assessments vary in complexity and scope
depending on what is proposed. Here, we present
a relatively simple possible model to provide a fair
representation of the system, i.e., controls preventing
the introduction of FMD into the United Kingdom.
We take a critical view of the model, suggest key ar-
eas where changes could improve reliability of the
results, and we caveat the use of the output to en-
sure that the conclusions drawn are in line with the
model capabilities. However, when considering the
data currently available on the threat to United King-
dom’s biosecurity, the systemic model provides an
additional source of information with which to in-
form policy decisions.
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4.4. Benefits of Systemic Risk Assessments
to Improve System Resilience
The systemic approach offered in this research
tool moves us on from an analysis of pathways of in-
troduction in isolation,(36,37) and focuses on analyz-
ing the overall performance of the multibarrier sys-
tem. It allows for the identification of critical areas
of the system, where intervention can reduce expo-
sure through multiple pathways, and thus have the
greatest impacts in reducing the overall residual risk
of introduction and exposure of commercial livestock
to FMDv.(11) This research does not comment on the
methods and instruments available for intervention.
It prioritizes the nodes and arcs of the system where
intervention is of greatest value to reduce the resid-
ual risk of an FMDoutbreak further, while additional
work may be required on the method of implemen-
tation and its benefits and impacts.
Intervention on the system of controls is a
complex task. Benefits from increasing control and
restricting movements must be weighed against the
potential direct and indirect costs to stakeholders,
the wider economy and trade. Gaining a greater
understanding of the causes of system vulnerability
allows measures to be proposed that offer the great-
est overall benefit for U.K. livestock health. In many
cases, the introduction of sanitary barriers to goods
traded has to be vetted. Political and regulatory
authorities, such as the World Trade Organisation
under the Sanitary and Phytosanitary agreements,
require a strong case for implementation to ensure
that additional barriers provide essential disease
control and are not driven by trade protectionism.(51)
Risk assessments are mandatory for supporting such
cases. In this capacity, systemic risk assessment may
highlight areas outside of disease control that are
directly relevant to disease spread. Therefore, they
may prove a powerful additional tool for demonstrat-
ing the need for implementing disease controls where
they have not previously been part of the system.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We have demonstrated the value of applying
a network analysis to the introduction of a specific
disease, in this case FMD to the United Kingdom.
The analysis of network nodes demonstrates the
significant role of existing disease controls alongside
the frequent challenge to control barriers that form
part of the same system. Furthermore, it enables an
examination of the opportunities for improvements
in control points and the extent to which further
investment in control may provide enhanced pro-
tection or be largely irrelevant compared to the
overall likelihood of risks. Finally, the research
model developed provides a structure with which to
examine the significance of national disease control
measures when reviewing potential changes that
may impact on trade.
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